

## Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in India: Internal Dimensions



### Abstract

*India has been one of the worst targets and victims of the menace of terrorism for decades. Ever since 1947, India has witnessed many attacks on the internal security of the nation, disrupting the civil society and the pillar of democracy. The parliament and the 26/11 attacks had been the worst days for the very fabric of the nation. The 9/11 attacks on the US proved to be a cornerstone in the future diagnosis of the menace. Since 9/11, global attention towards countering terrorism has gained emphasis. India has also been working towards meeting the requirements for a better and secure internal mechanism for national security. This study seeks to deal with conceptualizing terrorism and counter-terrorism and look at the internal dynamics of India's counter-terrorism strategies.*

**Dr. Sanjeev Kumar  
Tiwari**

Associate Professor

Political Science

Maharaja Agrasen

College,

University of Delhi.

[sanjeevtiwaridu@gmail.com](mailto:sanjeevtiwaridu@gmail.com)

### Introduction

India is not unsusceptible to the global scourge of terrorism. In fact, the epicenter of international terrorism is, as argued by scholars, located in South Asia. Provocation to the West, in the wake of 9/11, for launching the war on terror against the al-Qaeda and Taliban can be traced to the region. The proliferation of terrorist organizations and their systematic terror campaigns in the region have created a strong sense of insecurity, to which the South Asian states have not been able to respond collectively and consensually. India, one of the most affected parts of the region, has been a

victim of terrorism for many decades. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) released by the Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace, India accounted for 11 per cent of the global terrorist incidents during 2002-2009. There were 929 incidents of terrorism in India in 2016, killing 340 people and injuring 636 (Global Terrorism Index 2017).<sup>i</sup> In 2016, India witnessed an increase of 18 per cent in the number of deaths resulting from terrorism when compared to 2015. In fact, from 2002 to 2015 India has been ranked between second and sixth on the GTI (Ibid.).<sup>ii</sup> Pakistan's role in fomenting cross-border terrorism by providing sanctuaries, material support and weaponry to the terrorists has remained a major source of threat to India's national security. Naxalism in various parts of the country also has emerged as part of the terrorist menace. Another source of terrorism is the insurgent movements in north-eastern India.

Since terrorism has become a global phenomenon, counterterrorism has assumed an international dimension. India has enacted a number of anti-terror laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), etc. Development activities and use of intelligence has also been a mainstay of India's counterterrorism strategy. In this context, India has created a well-knit organisational structure – National Investigation Agency (NIA) and National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) – as part of its counter-terrorism measures.

This paper will explain all these aspects by making a comprehensive assessment of the internal dimensions of terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies.

### **Conceptualizing Terrorism**

Terrorism is basically an act or a series of acts which is used to instil fear in society for criminal or political ends. There is, however, no universally agreed definition of terrorism.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 defines terrorist acts as:

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror, or compel a government or international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act which contravened terrorism-related conventions and protocols, were not justifiable for any reason – whether of a political, philosophical ideological, racial, ethnic or religious nature. (United Nations 2014)<sup>iii</sup>

According to the European Union (EU), terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprising largely of serious offences against persons and property which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation (Europa 2010).<sup>iv</sup> According to

Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change (Bolz Jr 2002: 88).<sup>v</sup>

The Supreme Court of India, however, has gone further in defining terrorism. In Mohd. Iqbal M. Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, it said:

It may be possible to describe [terrorism] as use of violence when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the potential of producing on society as a whole.... If the object of the activity is to disturb harmony of society or to terrorise people and society, with a view to disturb the even tempo, tranquillity of society, and a sense of fear and insecurity is created in the minds of a section of society or society at large, then it will, undoubtedly be held to be a terrorist act. (Srivastav 2005)<sup>vi</sup>

Though there is no universal definition of terrorism, the legal definition by the US Department of State, which states “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (Kraft and Marks 2011: 1)<sup>vii</sup>, is widely accepted and commonly used. However the definitions discussed above might be non-universal, still the term terrorism possesses some common elements which give it a general meaning and relevance.

### **Terrorism in India**

Independent India began its existence with extreme insurgency in the North-East in the form of Naga insurgency and the terrorist Razakar movement in Hyderabad. In the 1960s, the

Naxalite movement commenced in West Bengal. Thereafter, there was a macabre phase of terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir (Tyagi 2007: 92).<sup>viii</sup> Currently, India has emerged as one of the world's worst targets of terrorism. The Global Terrorism Index (2015) ranks India sixth, with a score of 7.74, whereas Iraq stands at first among the top ten countries most affected by terrorism. In recent years, Naxalism has emerged as a strong movement in various parts of India. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the National Defence College in New Delhi in 2010:

Our country has been a victim of terrorism for the past more than two decades. Terrorism has been used as a means to destroy the values on which our nation is built. Terrorist groups enjoy patronage and sanctuaries and do not lack in resources. We therefore have to ensure that our capabilities to combat terrorism remain a step ahead of those of the terrorists. They should be left in no doubt whatsoever about our ability and resolve to defeat them. (PIB 2010)<sup>ix</sup>

In the present scenario, India has three distinct conflict zones, classified as High Intensity Conflict Area (Kashmir), Low Intensity Conflict Area (North-East), and areas affected by extremist violence like Naxalism (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar and certain pockets of Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh). Anand Kumar (2012: 56)<sup>x</sup> classifies four types of terrorism in India, viz., terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab sponsored by Pakistan; identity-related ethnic conflicts in the North-East; left-wing extremism, and Islamic radicalism connected to global jihad which has cross-border dimensions too. Generally, terrorist groups follow a particular ideology. Some terrorist groups

are based on the identity factor: a few groups are based on ethnicity while for some, religion becomes their *raison d'être*.

### *Political Ideology*

The Communist Party of India (Maoist – CPI (Maoist)) is based on the political ideology of overthrowing the Indian government through people’s war. Currently, it is considered to be the single biggest threat to India’s peace and internal security. They believe in overthrowing India’s “semi-colonial, semi-feudal” form of rule through armed struggle and establishment of a “communist society” where local support becomes the prime factor for their survival and longevity (BBC News 2011).<sup>xi</sup> The CPI (Maoist) has been responsible “for more than 90 per cent of total left-wing extremist incidents and 95 per cent of resultant killings” during 1999-2010 (see Table 1). (Ministry of Home Affairs 2012)<sup>xii</sup>

**Table 1: Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism: 2005-2014**

| Year | Civilians | Security Force Personnel | LWE/CPI-Maoists | Total |
|------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| 2005 | 281       | 150                      | 286             | 717   |
| 2006 | 266       | 128                      | 343             | 737   |
| 2007 | 240       | 218                      | 192             | 650   |
| 2008 | 220       | 214                      | 214             | 648   |
| 2009 | 391       | 312                      | 294             | 997   |
| 2010 | 626       | 277                      | 277             | 1180  |

|       |      |      |      |      |
|-------|------|------|------|------|
| 2011  | 275  | 128  | 199  | 602  |
| 2012  | 146  | 104  | 117  | 367  |
| 2013  | 159  | 111  | 151  | 421  |
| 2014  | 128  | 87   | 99   | 314  |
| Total | 2732 | 1729 | 2172 | 6633 |

(Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/index.html>)

### *Ethnicity and Identity*

Both ethnicity and identity play a considerable role in the emergence of terrorism and insurgency in India. The insurgency in North-East India is an example. The Government of India stated in 2013 that there are 65 terror groups active in the country, out of which 34 are in Manipur. The then Minister of State for Home, R.P.N. Singh, stated that among the other states in the North-East, Assam has 11, Meghalaya 4, Tripura 2, Nagaland 4, and Mizoram 2 (The Hindu 2013).<sup>xiii</sup> Many terror outfits have been groomed in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur on the grounds of ethnic separateness. The Indian Government is striving to resolve the issues causing insurgency in the country's north-east and has been successful to a large extent. The Indian Home Ministry's Annual Report noted that in 2013-14 the north-east region witnessed the least number of civilian and security personnel deaths and the least number of insurgent incidents too (For Northeast Fatalities see Table 2 below).

**Table 2: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in India's Northeast 2010-2014**

| Year  | Civilians | SFs | Terrorists | Total |
|-------|-----------|-----|------------|-------|
| 2010  | 77        | 22  | 223        | 322   |
| 2011  | 79        | 35  | 132        | 246   |
| 2012  | 90        | 18  | 208        | 316   |
| 2013  | 95        | 21  | 136        | 252   |
| 2014  | 245       | 23  | 197        | 465   |
| Total | 586       | 119 | 896        | 1601  |

(Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/index.html>)

### *Religion*

Religion has for a long time been a fundamental ground for resort to terrorism in India. Islamic terrorist activities in the country have been perceptible since partition. Sikh terrorism in Punjab with the demand for Khalistan in the 1980s further projected India's vulnerability to religion-based terrorism. Islamist terrorism in India is on a much larger scale than that of other religion-based terrorist groups. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has banned 36 terrorist organisations under section 35 of UAPA, 1967 (Ministry of Home Affairs 2014a)<sup>xiv</sup>, out of which 13 are Islamist terrorist groups active in India. SATP (the South Asia Terrorism Portal) has listed 180 terrorist groups active and conducting terrorist operations within India over the last 20 years, out of which 32 are from the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) region alone (SATP 2014).<sup>xv</sup> While the extremist groups active in North-East India are fighting in their region, the religion-driven terrorist groups are not only fighting for Kashmir but consider the



whole of India as their enemy. Islamist terrorist groups are expanding their network in the country, calling upon Indian Muslims to join them in the name of jihad. The key source of terrorism in India is Pakistan. Many perpetrators of terrorist acts have confessed to Pakistan's involvement in their terror activities. Terrorist groups have themselves proclaimed their base in Pakistan, getting training and shelters over there.

### **Impact of Terrorism in India**

Terrorism leaves long-term political, social and economic impacts. Though India has a history of sharing quality relations with its South Asian neighbours, cross-border terrorism and infiltration from Pakistan's soil have strained relations between the two. Bangladesh was also used for terrorist activities but the government initiatives and political cooperation between the two countries helped in controlling such activities. India-Pakistan border security is now much more tightened than before. Pakistan's inactivity in handing over perpetrators of the 26/11 attack to India has spoiled the political rhythm between the two. India is willing to make a peaceful political environment in entire region but Pakistan's state sponsored and cross border terrorism is not allowing to do so. International pressure on Pakistan to maintain good relations with India also seems to be ineffective.

Terrorism has also created panic among the masses. The changing patterns of attack, like on special dates or anniversaries have inhibited people from organising functions and from going out on festivals and holidays. A single terror strike creates a negative image of the political

system. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2015, the total terrorist attacks globally recorded in 2013 were 10,000, a 44 per cent increase from the previous year, whereas India witnessed a much higher percentage of terrorist attacks – by 70 per cent and the number of deaths increased from 238 to 404 (for India fatalities see Table 3 below).

**Table 3: India Fatalities: 2004-2014**

| Year  | Civilians | Security Force<br>Personnel | Terrorists | Total |
|-------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------|-------|
| 2004  | 886       | 434                         | 1322       | 2642  |
| 2005  | 1212      | 437                         | 1610       | 3259  |
| 2006  | 1118      | 388                         | 1264       | 2770  |
| 2007  | 1013      | 407                         | 1195       | 2615  |
| 2008  | 1030      | 372                         | 1217       | 2619  |
| 2009  | 721       | 431                         | 1080       | 2232  |
| 2010  | 759       | 371                         | 772        | 1902  |
| 2011  | 429       | 194                         | 450        | 1073  |
| 2012  | 252       | 139                         | 412        | 803   |
| 2013  | 304       | 193                         | 388        | 885   |
| 2014  | 407       | 161                         | 408        | 976   |
| Total | 7101      | 3527                        | 10118      | 21776 |

(Source: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/index.html>)

Terrorist attacks also have a great impact on the national economy. On the 26/11 Mumbai attack, the then Chief Economic Advisor in the Finance Ministry, Arvind Virmani, said that the terror attack on the country's financial capital would have a short-term impact on the economy, but the sentiments could be given a boost in the medium to long-term if the government responded by improving law and order. Non-economic shocks of this nature generally have little direct impact on the economy (The Economic Times 2008).<sup>xvi</sup>

Prime Minister Narendra Modi maintains that terrorism in India is an exported phenomenon. He has stated that "Terrorism has no borders. There is no good terrorist or bad terrorist. Terrorism is terrorism" (The Times of India 2014).<sup>xvii</sup> In the view of the current Union Home Minister, Rajnath Singh, India is suffering from state-sponsored terrorism. At the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit in 2014, he said that terrorism in India is "completely Pakistan-sponsored". Rejecting Pakistan's oft-repeated line that it is non-state actors that indulge in terrorism against India, he asked, "Is ISI a non-state actor?" He talked about ISI's links to al-Qaeda, LeT, Dawood Ibrahim and the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. He further asked, "Who helped Osama bin Laden? Who is helping Hafiz Saeed? ... We have requested Pakistan to act against them (Mumbai attack masterminds) but they drag their feet. So we say that terrorism is completely Pakistan-sponsored" (Hindustan Times 2014).<sup>xviii</sup>

According to the Indian Army, the serial terror attacks in J&K have an "unambiguous clear link to Pakistan" and the elements involved are "right at the top". In an interview given to NDTV, Lieutenant General Subrata Saha, the top army commander in Kashmir, said, "There

has been top-down coordination in Pakistan to synchronise the terror attacks.” This is because it is “not possible for non-state actors in Pakistan to operate without nexus with elements in the official establishment” (Dutt 2014).<sup>xix</sup>

### **Conceptualizing Counter-terrorism**

Countering terrorism is as difficult as defining terrorism as the threat of terrorism differs from country to country. The changing nature of terrorism has led to changes in counter-terrorism policies and strategies as well. Bruce Newsome describes counterterrorism as the “combination of defensive and offensive measures against political violence. It is a method to deal with threat which has achieved status of a most ‘critical’ threat of the post-Cold War period. Looking at the nature of the threat and its ability to inflict the large scale damage of a nation-state, the requirement is to tackle it with a cognitive approach” (Sen 2007).<sup>xx</sup>

The need of well-framed and effective counterterrorism measures has further led to the emergence of various counterterrorism models. Counterterrorism responses may be based either on the Criminal Justice Model (CJM) or War Model (WM). CJM regards terrorism as a crime and functions on the fundamental premise of preservation of democratic principles. Arrest and penalisation of terrorists are the aims of CJM when terrorists do not adhere to the rule of law (C. S. Steven and Gunaratna 2004: 101).<sup>xxi</sup> The war model considers terrorism as a tactic exercised in guerrilla activities or even acts of rebellion and follows the means of apprehending terrorists and eliminating terrorism. The war model gives preference to

restraining and countering terrorism rather than upholding liberal democratic principles. However, due to shortcomings and certain grey areas in both types of responses, nations usually opt for an Expanded Criminal Justice Model (ECJM), which is a hybrid of CJM and the war model. ECJM regards terrorism as an exceptional phenomenon that is not necessarily an act of war, but at the same time deviates from the standard definition of a felonious crime. Under ECJM, the responding forces are primarily police and secret services, occasionally complemented by special anti-terrorism units. The nature of response includes preventive arrests, surveillance techniques and gathering intelligence data, where the typical methods used by the secret services are with the intention of bringing suspects to trial.

### **India's Counter-terrorism Strategy: Internal Dimensions**

The terrorist attack in Mumbai, India's financial capital, on 26 November 2008, traumatised the entire nation but obliquely rendered positive aftermaths in terms of the country gearing up its counterterrorism policies. Earlier, India had only legal provisions to counter the challenge, lacking other imperative anti-terror institutions. These emerged after the Mumbai attack.

#### *Legal Provisions: Anti-Terror Laws*

Anti-terrorism legislation usually includes specific amendments that allow a state to bypass its own legislation when fighting terrorism or its related crimes. In democratic countries the use

of law as a tool to improve national security has always been an uneasy procedure, where the security interests may conflict with the more democratic goal of law and order and maintaining civil liberties. Notwithstanding, so far India has enacted three anti-terror laws, viz. the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 and 1987 (TADA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (POTA) and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967 (UAPA) amended in 2004 and 2008.

### *Institutional Mechanisms*

The growing menace of terrorism has induced nations to strengthen their institutional machinery to deal with it. The institutional mechanism comprises intelligence, both military and paramilitary forces, special squads and various agencies. In India, the Central Armed Police Forces, paramilitary forces and various squads have been constituted with special training to meet any terrorist situation. In 2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) designated the Assam Rifles as a Paramilitary Force and labelled six other forces as Central Armed Police Forces. The latter comprise Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), and National Security Guards (NSG). Assam Rifles, BSF, ITBP and SSB are the “Border Guarding Forces” (Ministry of Home Affairs 2013).<sup>xxii</sup> Also, meant especially to tackle terrorist activities are NSG, ATS, CoBRA, etc.

### *National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)*

NCTC is a proposed federal anti-terror agency to be created in India, modelled on the National Counterterrorism Center of the USA. The proposal arose after the 26/11 Mumbai attack, where several intelligence and operational failures exposed the need for a federal agency with real-time intelligence inputs of actionable value specifically to counter terrorist acts against India. The NCTC will scrutinise through intelligence shared by different agencies like IB, and decide what is needed. It will have the power to conduct searches and arrests in any part of India. It will also maintain a data base on terrorists and their associates, including their families, and will formulate a response to terror threats. NCTC will be located within the IB and will carry out counter-terror operations and collect, collate and disseminate data on terrorism (Chari 2012: 2-3).<sup>xxiii</sup>

Though the idea of the NCTC is taken from the US equivalent, the Indian NCTC is feeble in comparison to the US and British counterparts. The NCTC's standing council in India includes representatives of the states, which means it will serve as its governing body and the NCTC will only facilitate operations in conjunction with the state police. Some of the Indian NCTC's weaknesses are as follows:

- There is a huge disconnect between the central and state governments in their views on counterterrorism.
- Law and order being in the State List hampers countering externally sponsored terrorism.

- Like the United States Department of Homeland Security, a separate ministry other than the Home Ministry is required to confront the problem of terrorism.
- Covert operations must be included to enlarge counterterrorism policy and eliminate the problem at its roots (Kanwal 2012).<sup>xxiv</sup>

Since 2013, the operationalization of NCTC has been kept in abeyance. However, the lapses before and during the counter-terror operation in Pathankot in 2016 had underlined the need for NCTC kind of institution which could have helped preempt a terrorist attack as well as better coordinate post-attack operations (Kaura 2017).<sup>xxv</sup>

### *Intelligence*

Intelligence is the collection of information, especially of military and political value. But intelligence is not merely raw information that is collected. It has to be collated, analysed and disseminated to the users at the right time so that the unity and integrity of the country remains unharmed. The entire process of information gathering and finally its dissemination is termed as the intelligence process (Kasturi 2003: 102).<sup>xxvi</sup> The means of information gathering include espionage, communication interception, cryptanalysis, cooperation with other institutions, and evaluation of public sources. Intelligence services analyse areas relevant to national security; provide early warning of impending crises; serve national and international crisis management by helping to determine the intentions of current or potential opponents; and sometimes act covertly to influence the outcome of events in favour of



national interests. Intelligence agencies are also involved in defensive activities such as counter-espionage or counterterrorism. In India there is no chain of intelligence control, so each agency acts in its own domain with relative freedom and reports directly to the highest political or ministerial authority.

### *Use of Coercion*

According to Sederberg (2003: 274)<sup>xxvii</sup>, coercion as a counterterrorism strategy is to “harden the targets of terror and destroy the perpetrators and their patrons, including pre-emptive strikes against those contemplating terrorist attacks.” Coercive counterterrorism strategy can be reactive and proactive or defensive and aggressive, highly depending on its monopoly position within its own borders. A sovereign country, under international law, may adopt forceful measures such as use of military, anti-terrorist regulation and detainment in order to force and intimidate terrorists into submission (Crelinsten 2009: 48).<sup>xxviii</sup>

When other mechanisms failed to counter challenges such as insurgencies and terrorism, India has resorted to the use of coercion by making use of force or military. The Indian Army was first called in to tackle the Communist insurgency in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh from 1949 to 1952. Earlier in 1947 it also dealt with a Pakistani guerrilla invasion in Jammu and Kashmir. The Army has been involved since the 1950s in quelling the insurgencies in the North-East. The Army was also called into Punjab for action in the 1980s and has been deployed in J&K since 1990. The Indian Army and security forces have lost 5,962 personnel

in the J&K terrorism from 1990 to July 2010. In 2011, 45 security forces personnel died in the state, fighting terrorists. As many as 939 officers and men lost their lives in Manipur; 783 in Assam, 81 in Meghalaya, and 22 in Mizoram. Similarly, 1,226 security forces personnel have died fighting the Maoists between 2005 and 2010; till 5 July 2011, the country lost 204 men in uniform in this struggle. Since 1990, the security forces have faced 1,511 cases of human rights abuse. These were investigated by various agencies, including the National Human Rights Commission; 104 men, found guilty, have been punished; 1,473 were acquitted (Sood 2011: 76).<sup>xxix</sup>

The Army is deployed for counter-terror/insurgency action when the conditions become out of control for the police and paramilitary forces. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is therefore enforced to legalise its internal security activities. The Indian Army finds itself in unfamiliar and difficult terrain without adequate intelligence support; faces numerous problems of civil-military coordination and proprietary rights over the various forces involved. The police answer to the local government, the paramilitary forces to MHA and the Army has its own command structure under the Ministry of Defence. To coordinate between the central and local intelligence agencies in J&K, the concept of Unified Headquarters was introduced in 1994. It was also tried out in Assam in 1997 and in Manipur in 2004; but without statutory authority, it was not much of a success. The political parties were suspicious about the structure as it would provide the forces the power to plan counterinsurgency strategies that might be at variance with their political priorities (Ibid.).

## **Political and Socio-economic Measures**

In order to combat terrorism at the national level the Indian government has framed and implemented various political and socio-economic policies and schemes. In this way surrendered terrorists/extremists and militants can be brought into the mainstream. J&K, North-East region and left-wing-affected areas are the most terror-affected regions of the country. To reduce spontaneity among people and misguided youth from joining terror groups, various policies and schemes have been launched.

The objective behind surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy is to discourage the hard-core cadres who have strayed into the path of various terrorist and extremist activities and realise that they have been trapped. Another purpose is to ensure that those who surrender do not rejoin those terror camps. Each state government has framed its own surrender and rehabilitation policies and the central government reimburses the expenditure incurred on its own terms. The Government of India has revised the guidelines for “Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Scheme of Left Wing Extremists in the Affected States” with effect from 1 April 2013. The rehabilitation package includes a grant of Rs 2.5 lakh for higher-ranked left-wing extremist cadres and Rs 1.5 lakh for middle/lower-ranked cadres who surrender before the state governments. They are also provided a monthly stipend of Rs 4000 for a period of three years for vocational training. Incentives for surrender of weapons/ammunition, etc. are also provided. Under the scheme, 1,594 left-wing extremists surrendered from 2011 to 31 October 2014 before the state governments of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,

Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana and West Bengal (Ministry of Home Affairs 2014b).<sup>xxx</sup>

The government has also launched various development-related measures to reduce the tendency towards left-wing extremism. It has implemented various schemes like Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Ashram Schools, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP), Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY), and Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. In order to provide public infrastructure and services, the Planning Commission has initiated implementation of Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for Selected Tribal and Backward Districts in 2010-11. The scheme covered 60 left-wing extremism-affected/contiguous districts. Furthermore, continuation of “Additional Central Assistance (ACA) for LWE Affected Districts” has been approved by the central government with the coverage of 88 districts (Ministry of Home Affairs 2014: 32).<sup>xxxi</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Over the years, India has enhanced its capabilities to deal with the menace of terrorism. Legally, India has adopted UAPA 2008, which is currently the only law to deal with terrorism. India has also adopted various units at the institutional level, having various anti-

terror squads and intelligence to share information on any potential terror strike. It also has the newly formed NIA and awaited NCTC specially meant to counter terrorism. India has also adopted various socio-economic policies and schemes especially for the regions worst affected by terrorism and extremism. But we find that the NCTC is a big failure and the weak Indian intelligence setup is the worst part of India's counterterrorism strategy. India needs to follow the United States in the formation of its NCTC. A lot of work needs to be done to tackle terrorism.

India's counter-terrorism efforts have witnessed a mix of achievements and failures. But overall, it could be convincingly argued that India's counter-terrorism strategy has continued to be largely lacking in coherence. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs has recently recommended that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) "should immediately revive the idea of the NCTC as a single, unified counter-terrorism agency and re-issue the notification laying down the power, functions and duties of NCTC". This will, indeed, be a strong step in the right direction as NCTC should not become a victim of the politics of federalism as it became during the previous UPA regime. The need of the hour is coherence and coordination between various agencies and time-to-time review of policies and follow-up action incorporating the intelligence, ground realities and changes that take shape over time.

## Endnotes

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<sup>i</sup> Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National

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Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents.

<sup>ii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>iii</sup> United Nations (2014), United Nations Actions to Counter Terrorism, *Background: Secretary-General proposes Four-pillar strategy*, URL: <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/background.shtml>

<sup>iv</sup> Europa (2010), European Union, *EU rules on terrorist offences and related penalties*, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/fight\\_against\\_terrorism/133168\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/133168_en.htm)

<sup>v</sup> Bolz, Frank Jr. et al. (2002), *The Counterterrorism Handbook, Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques*, Washington DC: CRC Press.

<sup>vi</sup> Srivastav, V.P. (2005), *Prevention of Terrorism Act: Myth and Reality*, Delhi: Indian Publishers' Distributors.

<sup>vii</sup> Kraft, Michael B. and Edward Marks (2011), *U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What*, New York: CRC Press.

<sup>viii</sup> Tyagi, Anupam (2007), *Conventional Methods in unconventional Wars: Terrorism*, New Delhi: Regency Publications.

<sup>ix</sup> Press Information Bureau (2010), Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, *India-US Sign Counter Terrorism Cooperation Initiative*, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=63434>

<sup>x</sup> Kumar, Anand (2012), *The Terror Challenge in South Asia and Prospect of Regional Cooperation*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

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